of the law is unhelpful, since this may seem to imply the existence of capacities which do not exist . . ." (p. 60). In so far as title to sovereignty is concerned, the learned author suggests that discovery as title, inchoate or otherwise, could well be abandoned in view of the need of occupation (p. 137), and he considers it "inelegant" to describe prescription as a source of title, for "the genuine source in this type of case is recognition or acquiescence of the consequences of unchallenged possession" (p. 145). Like so many post-1945 lawyers, Dr. Brownlie rejects aggression and illegal seizure of territory as a valid source of title, but if such illegal seizure accords with self-determination "it is probable that, at the very least, recognition of the title of transference by third states would then be justifiable and would consolidate the rights of the holder" (p. 159). This is in accordance with his general view of self-determination as part of international law, so that "the operation of the principle of self-determination as a part of the *jus cogens* may support a doctrine of reversion : for example, rights of way granted by a colonial power may not be opposable to the state which, in replacing the colonial power, is recovering an independence which it formerly had" (p. 79).

Enough has been said to show that Dr. Brownlie's *Principles of Public International Law* is a stimulating and exciting work. It is, however, a work that can more readily be recommended to graduates than to undergraduates, for the latter are less likely to be aware of the traditionnal view or of statements made by the author which are not as yet parts of the *lex lata,* despite the endeavours of some states to make them such. When a new edition is prepared, as it is hoped it will be, perhaps Dr. Brownlie would consider expanding his index so as to include places and institutions by name, rather than leaving them to be found under some generic title, and perhaps he will expand such references as "Vattel in his influential *Le Droit des gens* (1758) may have adopted a theory of a maritime belt," without any page cited (p. 169, n.2), or "See also claims by the United Arab Republic in respect of the Suez attack in 1956, and claims against individual states involved in the joint occupation of Germany and Austria" (p. 377, n.2).

L. C. GREEN*

CASEBOOK WRITING AND THE CASE METHOD : SOME CHALLENGES IN CANADA. CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW. By Douglas A. Schmeiser. Toronto: Butterworths and Company. 1966. Pp. xxvi, 965. Index. $25.50.

The need in Canada for a set of teaching materials in any field of law is acute. Available instructional tools are inadequate, ranging from syllabi containing cases directly copied from the *Canadian Abridgment,* some "mi-

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meographed casebooks" that are, with few exceptions, mainly mediocre in quality, to a number of hardcover casebooks. The frightening increase of student population in our law schools is gradually driving us to the peak of the crisis. Though the growth of student body also implies better financial attraction in casebook writing, casebook writing is still a step-child venture of the law teacher. We still largely rely upon the traditional "syllabus." With it, we are driving our students, especially first year students, to the library, chasing reports, textbooks, extracts, or periodicals like a pack of wolves chasing a cunning prey. To get hold of the assigned material, our students complain, is difficult. Thus emerges ominously a "new morality" on stealing library books. The degree of wear and tear of library books is alarming; demand for the purchase of duplicate sets of reports, treatises and periodicals is persistent, at times overriding rational plans for the development of a balanced instructional and research library. The problem is obvious : it is physically impossible to make available to all students and professors the original materials for study and research. [1] The answer is simple : more casebooks should be published, for a casebook is a convenient device of transporting a part of the library into the classroom or any place of study.

In the face of this need, to sound a word of caution against hasty casebook preparation is timely. We should expect a casebook that is adequate to the demands of classroom instruction. A casebook is an essential device of the case method; it is, therefore, useful only if it serves to realize the fundamental objectives of the case method as conceived today. Hence, we may start off with an inquiry into the case method itself.

Langdell proclaimed in 1886 the philosophical thought on which the case method was constructed : "Law is Science." [2] The materials of this science are contained in printed books. The library, the repository of the ultimate source of legal knowledge, was the workshop of professors and students; "it is to us all that the laboratories of the universities are to the chemists and physicists, the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden to the botanists." [3] Teaching law was simply the guidance of students on their search for legal knowledge through the road of printed

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[1] No one realised this better than Christopher Columbus Langdell, the originator of the case method and casebook, when he prepared his casebook, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1st ed. 1871).

[2] Speech delivered at the 250th anniversary celebration of Harvard University on November 5, 1886 *in* 3 *L.Q.R.* 123, at 124 (1886). Armed with this sentence, Langdell sought to banish the vocationally oriented legal education of his time from the American scene and to place the law school "in the position occupied by law faculties in the universities of continental Europe." He argued : "If law be not a science, a university will consult its own dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a science it is a species of handicraft, and may best be learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who practises it." *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

books, a road which is new to them, by one who is well acquainted with it. [4] The underlying assumption of the process was that the student was to learn the common law (or equity) as a systematic, rational body of doctrine. [5]

This classical form of the case method has accommodated evolution and repelled revolution in its long career. Already amidst mourning of Langdell's death in 1906, his apologists celebrated what they claimed the method's ultimate triumph. [6] Since then, too, assertions about its superior quality have become vastly extravagant. During the recent American Association of Law Schools meeting in Washington, an American colleague even propounded to me the view that the case method is a distinctive characteristic of the common-law system, the lecture method that of the civil-law system. Most of these monotonous praises [7] are notoriously known; it is well to consider here the constructive criticisms that inject sanity and balance into our judgment of the method.

Langdell chose a vulnerable philosophical pillar as a foundation for his method. Law indeed is science, but to equate it with zoology, chemistry or physics is to becloud the distinctive methodology and basic orientation of law and these disciplines. Law is a cultural science (*Geisteswissenschaft*), whereas zoology, chemistry or physics are natural sciences (*Naturwissenschaften*); their methodology and orientation differ from that of law. The intellectual framework, methodological approach and even scientific aim of a student "dissecting" a case differ from that of a student dissecting a

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[4] Langdell has the following to say on the qualification of a law teacher: "What qualifies a person... to teach law, is not experience in the work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience, in short, in using law, but experience in learning law; ...." *Ibid.*

[5] Patterson, *The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origin and Objectives*, 4 J. LEG. EDUC. 1, at 11 (1951) (hereinafter cited Patterson). Langdell said in the *Preface* to his casebook on contracts:

> It seemed to me... to be possible to take such a branch of the law as Contracts, for example, and, without exceeding comparatively moderate limits, to select, classify, and arrange all cases which had contributed in any important degree to the growth, development or establishment of any of its essential doctrines; and that such a work could not fail to be of material service to all who desire to study that branch of law systematically and in its original sources.

Quoted in Patterson, at 11.

[6] See Waumbaugh, *Professor Langdell—A View of His Career*, 20 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1906). The rapid adoption of the case method in North America was influenced strongly by Redlich's report to the Carnegie Foundation on the case method in 1914. Redlich, a leading Austrian scholar, was invited to settle the dispute on the case method. Patterson, at 2. The impressive attempts, led by Pollock, Dicey and Finch, to establish the case method in England have not been as successful. Finch, after a visit at Harvard in 1885, returned to England to publish a casebook, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACT, PART I, and an inaugural address, *Legal Education, its Aim and Method*. See Note, 1 HARV. L. REV. 297, at 298 (1887). Dicey reviewing Finch's *Selection*, called the case method "the best method of legal study." Book Review, 2 L.Q.R. 88 (1886). See also Pollock's evaluation of the case method *in* Note, 5 L.Q.R. 228 (1889). English preference today may be gleaned from the remarks of Professor Gower that the American student is usually supplied by his teacher with a casebook already prepared, whereas in England "we encourage students to make their own casebook from original reports, and I cannot but think that this is a better training in the use of the tools of their trade." *Quoted in* Campbell, *Comparison of Educational Methods and Institutions*, 4 J. LEG. EDUC. 25, at 50 (1951).

[7] Professor Patterson listed ten of the method's merits compared to the textbook method of instruction. Patterson, at 20-21. They all flow, however, from simply one mental process, the analytic.

frog. [8] Calling the case method "scientific" in the sense that we understand a method "scientific" in the context of natural science is largely rhetorical. [9]

The case method has proven itself a bookish method, out of touch with reality; whatever trifling reality happens to filter through its rigid bookishness becomes distorted and lifeless in the appellate decisions that make up the casebook. [10] It tends to become too academic, yet unscholarly; a cold intellectualism, but miserably empty-headed; an exercise in semantics that often emerges as pointless as Humpty Dumpty's discourses. Indeed, it does not even represent a parallel of the actual mental work of a jurist. Lawyers and judges analyse a case with an attitude and purpose in mind not even faintly touched by the student analysing a "case." The art of formulating a theory of a case, of articulating the issues, of postulating alternative solutions to the problem presented, of exercising a certain amount of wisdom in the choice of a desirable, yet defensible, course of action, — the most pervasive mental operation of a jurist—is not the mental operation of a student "analysing a case." The appellate decision serves this to the student—like a T.V. dinner—all prepared and garnished. It was on this score that the late Judge Jerome Frank rightly condemned our law schools as "book-law schools," and not, as they should be, "lawyer-schools." [11]

More stunning was the revelation that the case method and casebook teach no law of practical utility to the student when he enters practice. [12] Whatever law he learns by osmosis is law nowhere; if at all, a law in a make-believe, in an "ideal" jurisdiction. The "law" thus reads like a book of the brothers Grimm from which one may draw a lesson on a story he must never seriously believe. The students, less capable to differentiate a tale from a fact, are thus often hopelessly misled. I asked my students in Legal

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[8] Redlich's decisive eulogy of the method, aside from repeating the same exaggeration of the method's merit, accidentally exposed this mistake when, following the German traditional classification of science into *Geisteswissenschaft* and *Naturwissenschaft*, he called legal science an intellectual science or *Geisteswissenschaft*. See Patterson, at 5. Langdell's use of this sentence to locate the law school within the university structure following the continental European system proceeds from a wrong premise. Law, philosophy and theology are classical disciplines within European universities without claiming the absurb equation attempted by Langdell. For a recent insistence on the analogy of law and natural science, see Nutting, *The Emerging Lawyer and Legal Education*, 16 AM. U.L. REV. 1, at 12-14 (1966).

[9] Patterson, at 4-5.

[10] Llewellyn has, with customary clarity, demonstrated this point. See THE BRAMBLE BUSH 25-40 (1951).

[11] *A Plea for Lawyer-Schools*, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, at 1312 (1947). Frank was certain who the villain was: "American legal education went badly wrong some seventy years ago when it was seduced by a brilliant neurotic... Christopher Columbus Langdell." *Id.* at 1303. For the many criticisms of Frank, see his writings cited in *id.* at 1303, n.1.

The main objection of Frank concerns Langdell's philosophy of legal education which he termed was that of a man who cherished "inaccessible retirement." "Inaccessibility, a nostalgia for the forgotten past, devotion to the hush and quiet of a library, exclusion from consideration of the all-too-human clashes of personalities in law office and courtroom, the building of a pseudo-scientific system based solely upon book materials—of these Langdell compounded the Langdell method." *Id.* at 1304.

[12] Kales, *The Next Step in the Evolution of the Case-Book*, 21 HARV. L. REV. 92 (1907).

Research Seminar, all supposed as associates in an Ottawa law firm, to write a memorandum of law on a peculiar Ontario problem, and they gave me a short essay on the glorious past of English law, even neglecting to examine a recent Ontario case in point. I received, in short, a fossil wrapped with the myth that the colonial days are not over, that English courts are more authoritative in Ontario than our own. No less than Langdell's many famous students perceived this shortcoming. For instance, Joseph Beale related :

> He was quoted as speaking of 'a comparatively recent case decided by Lord Hardwicke,' and he was believed to regard modern decisions as beneath his notice. In the subjects of Equity and Suretyships, which he was then teaching, one might have fancied from his list of cases that Lord Eldon was still on the woolsack and that America was legally undiscovered. Even his warmest admirers felt constrained to give up his course on Mortgages when at Christmas-time he was still dealing with the rights of tenant and mortgagee under a common law mortgage, and had not yet informed us that equity preserved a right of redemption after breach. [13]

One can also challenge the suitability of the case method to the emphasis of modern legal education. Today's complex society requires complex rules, and the mass of statutes, regulations, reports, and other materials is staggering. A competent and knowledgeable lawyer is now a necessity; law schools are being pressed to produce lawyers who not only can talk about law, but also know their law. There is too much for us to teach and for students to learn, but we are, with the aid of the case method, reasoning our students to ignorance. The case method was suitable to the halcyon, horse-and-buggy days of Langdell; [14] in our day it has been overtaken by a fatal shortcoming : it imparts so little information in so much time. As Llewellyn succinctly put it : "Man could hardly devise a more wasteful method of imparting information." [15] Our students are learning law by a method unduly expensive and inefficient for a return so ridiculously meagre. [16]

The apologists of the case method might argue that the method intends to develop analytic and reasoning skill, not to impart information. The casebook is not a book of law but a book of problems. Legal problems in one jurisdiction bear affinity to similar legal problems in another. The student thereby learns something of utility to him, in fact, with the added advantage that he is not committed to one jurisdiction.

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[13] *Professor Langdell—Later Teaching Days*, 20 HARV. L. REV. 9, at 10 (1907).

[14] Yntema, *Foreword* to F. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW xii (1953).

[15] K. LLEWELLYN, EDUCATION FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1948) *quoted in* Campbell, *op. cit. supra* note 6, at 50.

[16] Yntema remarked: "[I]n terms of the time required to cover a given subject matter, this is a most expensive technique, and if too selective, as it must be when the mass of materials to be mastered is large, it becomes a sort of anecdotal casuistry .... [I]t too frequently is a simulacrum of what a Socratic method might be, nor yet an integrated logical expose of the subject matter." Yntema, *op. cit. supra* note 14, at xii-xiii.

This argument has little merit. Legal problems are similar only in so far as alike problems underlie the same ethical question. But this is not equivalent to saying that all jurisdictions provide the same solution to the same legal problem. Subtle cultural, geographical and even temperamental variations have often produced substantially different solutions to similar legal problems. The client in a particular jurisdiction has a more pragmatic interest than being informed of ethical points: he wants a legal solution. Though he may admire his lawyer's philosophising, he knows also that it may not be a penny's worth in court. Besides, the premise of the argument is badly mistaken, for it is quite clear that the case method cannot provide adequate insight into the ethical and other extralegal aspects of legal principles or doctrines.[17] Actually, the argument that law schools teach legal reasoning, not impart information, is a mere quibble. A reasoning without adequate information about the premises is certainly a pretty empty-headed reasoning.[18] It is as absurd as teaching a person to play chess without informing him of the rules of the game.[19]

I am, of course, persuaded that the cultivation of the analytic process is a legitimate aim of legal education, but I reject the view that this is the only, or even the main, aim of legal education. I urge that we should heed Dean Griswold's recent warning against the danger of excessive reliance upon the case method: "The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life." We should share his concern with the ill-effects on legal education of the method's "premium on verbal manipulation" and "exaltation of rationality over other values which are of great importance in our society."[20] Three years of analysing is simply too much; to confine its emphasis in the first year is perhaps more commensurate to its value. We have good grounds to assume that a student who has not acquired the skill of legal analysis after one year in law school is a hopeless case; an additional two-year dosage of analysing will do him no good. Besides, the pedagogic quality of the case method diminishes with progressing legal work; there is some truth, I suspect, in the current gibe that law teachers "bore the student to death" in the third year of study.

A meaningful legal education, aside from imparting sufficient amount of legal knowledge and developing an appreciation of the realities of law in action, must not only cultivate the analytic process but also other equally significant processes. John Wigmore has identified some of these processes that we nonchalantly ignore.[21] First, the historic process of thought, the

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[17] Patterson, at 22.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] This sort of afterthought was not put forward by Langdell himself. His assumption was to teach the common law (of contract) as a systematic body of doctrine. See quotations from his *Preface* to A SELECTION ON THE CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, *in* Patterson, at 7, n.32, 8, n.1.

[20] Harvard L. Rec., Oct. 5, 1967, at 3, cols. 1-2.

[21] *Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae*, 30 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1917).

realisation of law as a moving, developing phenomenon, that law is in a state of constant motion, like a kaleidoscope. Second, the legislative process, the skill of mentally positing before us the complexity of social life and activity, of postulating anticipated points of conflict that require regulation, of formulating policy decisions, and of translating these decisions into clear, brief and general rules of law. The neglect of this process is perhaps one cause of the lack of American skill in the art of legislation. What a continental legislator can effectively and beautifully express in one sentence, the American legislator needs a whole chapter of complex, longwinded, verbose, repetitious and casuistic provisions that nevertheless succumb to yearly amendment. Third, the synthetic process, the process of building up individual rules and principles into a consistent, logically organised system. The case method represses the student's desire for order; indeed it encourages the isolation of a rule from other rules. Fourth, the teaching method must stimulate the comparative process of thought, the observance of our legal system from the outside, and the appreciation that other legal systems function as efficiently as ours with the use of different techniques or methods. Wigmore rightly perceived that the case method is egocentric, an objection not overcome by the unfounded claim that it provides a "built-in comparative law." Fifth, we must provide a more intensive cultivation of the operative process. Though the case method makes the students aware of the "living law," the non-formal rules actually observed in the social milieu, it exhibits only a casual, scanty insight into these rules that are often more significant in the smooth flow of trade, industry, or even ordinary life.

These observations on the case method argue partly for curriculum reform, primarily for the improvement of its structure and essential device, the casebook. Many have been realised in American law schools; casebook preparation in the United States has gone far to accommodate remedial changes. The same challenge is at hand in Canada; casebook editors must attempt to meet the method's shortcoming in their casebook, and, if possible, undertake their own experiments. In the face of this challenge, this first Canadian casebook on criminal law is a great disappointment. It is composed along lines as if the demands of the case method and the structure of a casebook had barely changed since Langdell's time. [22]

I discern no rational criterion in the editor's selection of materials included in this casebook. The old English landmarks, *M'Naghten, Levett, Hodge, Prince, Tolson, Dudley & Stephens*, and so on, are here. But,

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[22] Compare the casebook under review with the following American casebooks: L. HALL & S. GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 1958); F. INBAU & C. SOWLE, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1964); A. HARNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1957); J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940); M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES—CASES AND MATERIALS (1962); J. HALL & G. MUELLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1965).

whereas Langdell erred in unrealistically limiting his casebook to old standbys, Schmeiser has erred in making his casebook as current as an advance sheet. Of the 364 cases chosen, the editor took 72 cases alone from the period between 1960 and 1966. Including very recent cases increases the utility of a book as a "reference," but it may diminish its primary value as a classroom tool. The trouble is that almost all of the cases selected do not lend themselves to a discussion that could exploit to full advantage the pedagogical merit of the case method. They are neither—to use Langdell's term—"influential," nor problematic, not even dramatic, to challenge creative analysis or reasoning. It is well to refer to recent cases for they provide a sense of immediacy to the problems considered. The little significance of the cases chosen by Schmeiser, however, does not justify the prominence and pages they assume and consume in this casebook. He should have summarised these cases, along with other unchallenging cases, in the form of editorial notes. For instance, in the section "Mental Element," Schmeiser included 43 cases that consumed 102 pages of his book. The basic problem in this section is a simple one : Does mistake (or ignorance) negate the existence of an offence ? Five good cases would have sufficed : one case that identifies the basic problem and subordinate issues; one that highlights facts and policy considerations that argue for the recognition of a defence based on mistake of fact, followed by a case that develops the opposite; and two cases along the same line involving mistake of law. All others could have been eliminated or otherwise summarised in an editorial note.

The editor missed his opportunity of providing us in his casebook an insight into the "realities" of law in action and an adequate amount of knowledge on the criminal law of Canada. Extralegal materials that may make us aware of important ethical, sociological and psychological considerations that have decisive bearing on the criminal process, legal materials that examine intricate theoretical and practical criminal-law problems, all these are regrettably missing. Some scanty extracts from textbooks and articles are here, but largely linked as a "Comment" on a case. There are 10 or so short statutory materials, a snippet on *mens rea* from the *Canadian Encyclopedic Digest*, and a three-page extract from the *Report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity* of 1956. In the main, this is an appellate decision casebook. Thus it lacks "reality," and I am afraid that classroom use of this book would result in what Frank called a "sham case-system." For, as Frank pointedly remarked, it is absurd that we should continue to call an upper court opinion a case; it is rather an essay published by an upper court in explanation of its decision. [23]

I do not urge that the editor should jump into the obvious danger of burying the value of his casebook beneath an avalanche of irrelevant

[23] *Op. cit. supra* note 11, at 1315.

"realities." Nor am I suggesting that criminal law and criminology are not distinct disciplines. Indeed, I must confess that I cannot admire *Donnelly, Goldstein & Schwartz, Criminal Law*,[24] for these editors unhappily confused criminal law, as a science of legal norms, with criminology, a science of fact. They have fallen victims to the obvious temptation of preparing a casebook on criminal law that deals, not with law, but with the criminal. What is more dangerous is that they will produce amateur and half-baked sociologists and psychologists later to possess the awesome power of determining criminal policy without a lingering knowledge of operative criminal law. This is, I agree, too much "reality," and absurd. But Schmeiser's casebook errs in the opposite direction: it offers no reality at all. The arrangement of the cases is unsystematic and uninspired; it is largely chronological. The choice of headings and the grouping of cases follow the traditional abstraction: "Elements of a Crime"; "Defences"; "Capacity"; "Justification" (Is justification not a defence?); "Parties to Offences"; concluded by "Specific Offences."

More care in editing the cases could be desired. The garrulity of the judges was allowed to gallop through the book unhindered; citations that students never read found their place; unnecessary words or phrases ("Italics mine," that is, the court's; "and cases cited"; "at the foot of p. 170"; "*vide*," "*infra*," "*supra*") also have their share. The thickness of this book is disheartening enough to a first year student, even without giving him the wrong impression that he may also have to read the cases cited by the courts in their decision.

On the other hand, overediting has found its mark; the editor has extensively cut some cases to provide the student only with the rule or principle involved. He placed such cases at the beginning of some headings, followed by the more extensive case material. Since the short extract practically embodies the synthesis of the following cases, the editor very nearly turned his book into an "illustrative casebook," condemned as heresy in the case method. Almost the same function was served by his "Problems," with the added effect of denying an opportunity to the student to discover the problems for himself.

The "Comments" following some cases are not informative enough. They should have included expanded references to the Criminal Code and other special laws. Thus, the unsuitability of a casebook to impart information could have been partly overcome. The Criminal Code and other statutory materials are necessary; after all a criminal-law course, especially in Canada, is a course in legislation. Besides, his "Comments" repeatedly ask questions that are embarrassingly naive to ask because the instructor

[24] (1962).

and the students will ask themselves these questions without editorial nagging (*e.g.*, Do you think that *So and So* was rightly decided ?).

This casebook under review, like any casebook, is—to borrow a current phrase—a "portable library." [25] This is its only merit. Its adoption in a criminal-law course will considerably reduce traffic in the library; if not adopted but enough copies are purchased for the library, directing the students to the casebook rather than to the original reports would reduce the incidence of wear and tear of library books.

The quality of a casebook as an exhaustive digest and abbreviated report rolled into one justifies the editor's and publisher's claim that "practitioners may find it a convenient reference to leading cases." [26] Indeed I feel that the editor has gone so far to please the practitioners that he has ended up displeasing law teachers like me. Still, I feel compelled to dampen the claim somewhat. Casebooks are not meant to replace a report or digest. Casebooks have limited usefulness in meeting the practitioner's standard of research for authority. A wise practitioner should use this casebook only as a starting point for further research, not as the final reference to authorities.

One last word : the price, even the student price, is prohibitive. More than anything, the price will hurt its chances of being used in Canadian law schools. The price, of course, corresponds to the size. But we would expect, with the presence of the Criminal Code, a smaller and better casebook at a less onerous price. I sincerely hope that the editor will attempt such a casebook in his next edition.

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[25] C. WRIGHT, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS at vi (3d ed. 1963).
[26] D. SCHMEISER, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW at vii (1966).
* Of the Board of Editors.